The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [1, 5] says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial-that is, there exists a fixed voter whose top choice is always chosen as the winner. Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness where voters believe that the other voters' preferences are i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed). In particular, McLennan [2] shows that if an anonymous voting rule (with at least 3 candidates) is strategy-proof w.r.t. all i.i.d. beliefs and is also Pareto efficient, then the voting rule must be a random dictatorshipthat is, a uniformly random voter's top choice is chosen as the winner. Our first theorem strengthens McLennan's result by showing that relaxing Pareto efficiency to -Pareto efficiency (where Pareto efficiency can be violated with probability ) does not help, even for rather large values of , and even for a significantly weaker notion of -Pareto efficiency. Thus, even for an extremely weak notion of what it means to be a "reasonable" voting rule, strategy-proofness w.r.t. all i.i.d. beliefs cannot be achieved.
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with "mesh size" at least α. We consider strategy-proofness w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and we focus on "large-scale" voting where the number of voters n is sufficiently large but is still polynomially-related to 1/α, where α is the coarseness parameter. A voting rule is said to be large-scale strategyproof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs if there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every coarseness parameter α > 0, and every n ≥ p(1/α), no voter having an α-coarse i.i.d. belief can improve her expected utility by lying about her preferences.
We construct good voting rules that are large-scale strategyproof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, thus circumventing the above impossibility results. In particular, we construct anonymous -Pareto efficient voting rules that are large-scale strategyproof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where is exponentially small in the number of voters. One of our voting rules is a variant of the well-known instant-runoff voting rule, which is used in many elections throughout the world. 
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